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Abstract
We focus on an “equilibrium analysis” of coordination problems in giving that
lead to multiple equilibria; the notion of strategic complements and substitutes turns
out to be useful in this regard. Some societies can get stuck at a low level of giving
while others might, by accident or policy, be able to coordinate on a higher level of
giving. Ceteris-paribus, this furnishes one plausible reason for heterogeneity in phil-
anthropy. We give conditions under which tax exemptions to private giving can have
perverse eﬀects by reducing equilibrium private giving. Direct government grants to
charity, possibly temporary, can enable an economy stuck at an equilibrium with a
low level of giving to attain an equilibrium with a high level of giving. Therefore, di-
rect government grants can crowd-in private giving to charity. The paper contributes
to the economics of philanthropy as well as to an understanding of the role of public
policy in the face of private coordination failures.
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Philanthropic activity is associated with several well known stylized facts; we will highlight
three important ones.
1. Private philanthropic activity is important and varies signiﬁcantly across countries.
Figures for the United States, where philanthropic activity has been particularly well
documented, are suggestive of the magnitudes. In 1995, as a percentage of income,
giving has varied between 1.5 - 2.1 percent, 68.5 percent of all households gave to
charity with the average gift being $1081 and those with the lowest incomes give
over 4 percent of income to charity. There is signiﬁcant cross country heterogeneity.
As a percentage of GDP, over the period 1995-2000, such activity was in excess of
4 percent for the Netherlands and Sweden; between 3 and 4 percent for Norway
and Tanzania; between 2 to 3 percent for France, United Kingdom, USA, Israel and
Spain; and less than 0.5 percent for India, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico and Poland1.
2. Private individuals are by no means the only contributors to charity. Charities receive
substantial direct grants from the government, the corporate sector, charitable trusts
and foundations, and (in the West) from lottery money. Governments, operating
normally through direct grants, are typically the single most important contributors
to charities. On average, in the developed countries, charities receive close to half
their total budget directly as grants from the government, while the average for
developing countries is about 21.6 percent2.
3. Contributions to charity are tax deductible in many cases. However, the deduction
is not generally at the full marginal rate of tax and is typically capped at some upper
rate3. Irrespective of the rate, the tax deduction acts as a reduction in the price of
giving to charity.
In light of these stylized facts we broadly ask the following questions. First, why is
there individual heterogeneity in the magnitude of giving, say, across groups, regions or
countries? Second, what is the role of direct grants to charities made by the government?
1These ﬁgures are from Salamon et. al. (2004). The ﬁgures do not include donations to religious
congregations which are a substatial component for countries such as the USA.
2These ﬁgures are from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonproﬁt Sector Project. The data can
be accessed from their website http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/. Non-governmental organizations are also an
important source of contributors. In the UK, for instance, charitable trusts and foundations give grants
worth £700 million a year while the National Lottery, another major contributor, had, by September 2001,
awarded more than 45,000 grants worth a total of more than £2 billion through its Community Fund.
3In the USA, deductions are allowed at a rate of up to 50 percent of taxable income for donations to
public charity but at a rate of 30 percent when donations are to a private foundation. In Canada the rate
of deductions allowed increases from 17 percent to 29 percent depending on the amount donated.
1Third, what is the precise role of tax deductions (or subsidies) to giving? All three of these
q u e s t i o n sh a v eb e e na s k e db e f o r ea n dt h e r ei sb yn o wa ne x t e n s i v el i t e r a t u r eo nt h e s e
issues4. However, the literature has typically focussed on a unique equilibrium in giving.
This, we believe, masks several features of the problem when there are multiple equilibria
in giving arising from the uncoordinated eﬀorts of a very large number of givers in an
economy.
Before we outline our approach and the main results, we situate our paper in the
context of some of the related theoretical literature.
1.1. Related Literature
Rigorous theoretical work in the area began with Becker (1974), which was extended by
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). These models stress the following important feature
of the problem. Charitable giving has the nature of a public good. Givers care only about
the sum total of giving by all givers; such givers are said to be motivated by a feeling
of altruism or benevolence. Thus, only the total donations received by the charity enter
an individual’s utility function and, so, giving by one individual is a perfect substitute
by another. This gives rise to a free rider problem. Any individual giver is indiﬀerent to
the source of a gift received by the charity, hence, would prefer someone else to make the
donation. The model has some unattractive features, however. If public grants are ﬁnanced
by taxes on givers, they completely crowd out private giving, leaving the total supply
of the public good unchanged5, which does not seem to be supported by the empirical
evidence. Furthermore, when the number of givers is large, even distortionary taxes become
approximately neutral and redistribution of incomes between givers is neutral; see, for
instance, Andreoni (2004).
An alternative approach was developed by Cornes and Sandler (1984) and Andreoni
(1989, 1990)6. This approach introduces a direct utility, or warm glow,f r o mo n e ’ so w n
giving, but retains altruism7. Warm glow ensures that one’s own giving is not a perfect
substitute for the giving of others, hence, creating an additional incentive to give, which
mitigates the free rider problem. It also obviously implies that government grants to
charities do not crowd out private donations completely because the two are imperfect
4Andreoni (2004) provides a fairly exhaustive survey of the issues.
5At a corner solution in which no one contributes, and so no crowding-out can take place, then there
is a potential eﬃciency enhancing role for the government in giving direct grants to the charity ﬁnanced
by taxes on givers.
6A variant of this approach was orginally suggested by Becker (1974) in a footnote.
7The literature does not precisely pin down the source of warm glow to one speciﬁc factor. Andreoni
(2004) explains it thus: “humans are moral- they enjoy doing what is right. They are emotional, empathic
and sympathetic- they enjoy gratitude and recognition, they enjoy making someone else happy, and they
feel relieved from guilt when they become a giver. Put more simply and more generally, people may
experience a warm glow from giving.”
2substitutes from the point of view of givers. There is strong support for warm glow in
experimental data; see for instance, Andreoni(1993), Palfrey and Prisby (1997).
The theoretical literature has also explored the implications of tax deductions for char-
itable giving; see for instance, Feldstein (1980), Boadway and Keen (1993), Diamond
(2003). In general, subsidies in this literature increase private giving by individuals, while
direct government grants, because they rely on distortionary taxation, are less attractive.
Our paper is most closely related to Andreoni (1998) and complements his analysis.
In Andreoni (1998), multiple equilibria arise if and only if there are non-convexities in the
production technology of the public good in the following sense. Aggregate donations must
exceed a certain threshold for production of the public good to be possible8.I t c a n b e
shown that there are two Nash equilibria. One in which none contribute so the public good
is not produced, and another in which at least one individual contributes and a positive
level of the public good is produced. Our paper diﬀers from this approach in the following
ways. First, and most fundamentally, we show that multiple equilibria can arise even when
there are no non-convexities in production. Furthermore, in our model, aggregate contri-
butions are positive in the lower, as well as the higher, equilibrium. Second, we perform
a welfare analysis in a general equilibrium model with a government budget constraint.
Hence, the public policy variables are determined “optimally”. Furthermore, the “socially
optimal” public policy depends on which of the multiple equilibria is achieved. Third, in
Andreoni (1998), public policy can help move an economy stuck at a low equilibrium in
giving to a high equilibrium. However, this requires that the government have the ability
to levy taxes based on individual characteristics. This might be diﬃcult, even illegal, in
practice. We need, however, the much weaker restriction that the government be able to
observe and verify the income of individuals. Fourth, our focus is on the aggregate giving
of all individuals in an economy rather than on issues of the startup of a speciﬁcc h a r i t y .
1.2. Multiple Equilibria
The existing literature, with the notable exception of Andreoni (1998), focusses on a
unique equilibrium. But it is entirely plausible that coordination problems among diverse
and numerous givers give rise to multiple equilibria. For instance, if you conjecture that
the aggregate gift of others to a charity will be high, so that the charity is ‘large’, then
you might also be induced to contribute a high amount. This could occur, for instance,
if you get a greater warm glow from contributing to larger, presumably more prominent,
charities9. In this case, private giving and the size of the charity are strategic complements.
8Such non-convexities seem more important when a charity or a cause is to be set up rather than in
the continued operation of the charity.
9Larger charities might also be a signal of greater importance of the cause for which the charity seeks
funding, or reputation of the charity in channeling funds eﬃciently and honestly etc. Hence, it is plausible
3Analogously, if your conjecture is a lower aggregate amount, then you might also contribute
a lower amount, because, on accounts of strategic complements, your warm glow is now
smaller. Hence, there could be several, self fulﬁlling, rational expectations equilibria. In
some, giving is high, while in others, giving is low10.
The high equilibrium could, of course, be welfare improving. However, coordination
problems might prevent private individuals from attaining it. Resultingly, the economy
might get stuck in the low equilibrium. Public policy could then play an important role
in engineering a move from the low to the high equilibrium. We focus on this feature of
the problem.
The possibility of multiple equilibria creates the potential for a richer set of results.
1.3. Some Results and Intuition
1. Multiple equilibria are suggestive of a natural explanation for cross country (or group
or regional) heterogeneity in giving. Among identical societies some can get stuck
at a low level of giving, while others might ﬁnd themselves in an equilibrium with a
high level of giving. The existing models, with a unique equilibrium, would have to
rely on heterogeneity in tastes or preferences to explain this phenomenon.
2. We show that if private individual giving and aggregate giving are strategic com-
plements, then subsidizing private individual giving can have the perverse eﬀect of
reducing aggregate giving. In this case, we show how public policy in the form of
direct government grants to charity can engineer an escape from an equilibrium with
a low level of giving to a better equilibrium with a high level of giving. Therefore, di-
rect government grants can crowd-in rather than crowd-out private giving to charity.
This obviously contrasts with the classical analysis of subsidies to charities, in the
context of a unique equilibrium in giving, which is unfavorable to direct government
grants; see, for instance, Feldstein (1980). In light of our analysis, then, (potentially
temporary) government grants could be recommended on normative criteria.
Some intuition behind our second set of results is as follows. Consider a situation
of multiple equilibria in aggregate giving, that has two equilibria, low and high.W e
show, in plausible cases, that at the low equilibrium subsidies can actually reduce
aggregate giving. In such a case, suppose that the government gives a (possibly tem-
porary) direct grant to charity, ﬁnanced by taxation, at least equal to the aggregate
giving at the low equilibrium. The sum of public and private contributions now ex-
ceeds the level attained at the low equilibrium, which rules out the low equilibrium
that consumers might feel more assured in giving to such charities.
10We also show, formally, that when private giving and the size of the charity are strategic substitutes
then the equilibrium is unique.
4as a candidate. With only two possible equilibria, high and low, this must push the
economy to attain the high equilibrium, by default, because the low equilibrium is
ruled out. Furthermore, it might be the case that at the high equilibrium, subsidies
are eﬀective. In that case, replacing the direct government grant by private contri-
butions induced through subsidies is welfare improving because grants provide no
warm glow, while private giving does. Hence, temporary direct government grants
allow public policy to solve the private coordination problem.
3. Finally, we give conditions that specify the optimal mix of public contributions
(through direct government grants) and private contributions to charity. We es-
tablish suﬃcient conditions for giving to charity to be funded entirely by private
individual donations, possibly subsidized from taxation, and there is no public con-
tribution to charity. For other parameter values, however, subsidies can have perverse
eﬀects and direct government grants can improve welfare.
Throughout, our focus is on equilibrium analysis. We provide no rigorous analysis of
the time path between two equilibria. Further comments on this issue can be found in
Section 7 below.
1.4. Schematic Outline
The schematic outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the general theoretical
model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium of the model and its comparative static results.
Section 4 examines multiple equilibria in aggregate giving. Section 5 performs a welfare
analysis and characterizes the normatively optimal public policy. Section 6 provides two
illustrative examples of the general theoretical model applied respectively to (1) contri-
butions to charity that support income redistribution, and (2) voluntary gifts to public
good provision, in particular, when the public good takes the form of some essential public
infrastructure11. In Section 7 we collect, brieﬂy, some of our thoughts on dynamic analysis
of the game. Section 8 explores the implications of strategic giving and illustrates the
robustness of our results. Finally Section 9 concludes. All proofs are collected in the
appendix.
2. Model
There are three main types of players in the economy, (1) consumers,( 2 )aﬁscal au-
thority (which we will simply refer to as the Government), and (3) charities.T h e r ea r e
11This paper can also be viewed as a model of voluntary contributions to public goods, as the second
example shows. However, for expositional considerations, throughout, we will couch the model in terms
of giving to charity.
5n consumers indexed by i =1 ,2,...,n.C o n s u m e r i has an exogenously ﬁxed income of
mi ≥ 0 each period. Deﬁne the vector of individual incomes m =( m1,m 2,...,mn) and the





Assume that M>0, i.e., at least some consumers have positive income.
2.1. Fiscal Instruments
The government exercises the following three types of ﬁscal instruments.
1. An income tax on individual income, mi, at the rate t, 0 ≤ t<1.
2. A subsidy to “private” giving to charity at the rate s, 0 ≤ s<1.
3. Direct “public” contribution to charity given by D ≥ 0.
2.2. Consumers








The consumer derives utility from private consumption expenditure, ci ≥ 0,f r o m‘ o w n ’
giving to charity (warm glow), gi ≥ 0, and from the aggregate level of giving to charity
(altruism), G ≥ 0. We will use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. The assumptions
on preferences are that ui is C2 and ui
1 > 0,u i
2 ≥ 0,u i
3 ≥ 0 with ui
2 > 0 for some i.
The budget constraint of consumer i is given by
c
i +( 1− s)g
i ≤ (1 − t)m
i (2.3)
The RHS of (2.3) is the (net of tax) income of the individual, while the LHS gives the
two sources of expenditure, private consumption expenditure and (net of subsidy) private
giving to charities.
Furthermore, we assume that each gi is a small fraction of G, so that each consumer
takes the aggregate G as given12. Thus, in making her decision to allocate after-tax income
12Our motivation for doing so is that, in most situations of interest, the individual contribution is a
negligible fraction of the total budget of a charity. This deviates from the standard literature, which
is usually based on a Nash equilibrium in giving to charity. Such an approach complicates the analysis
(even with identical consumers), without changing the qualitative conclusions, or signiﬁcantly altering
the quantitative results. In Section 8 below, we show this to be the case by performing simulation
analysis to compare the two cases of strategic and non-strategic giving. Our approach can, of course, be
made completely rigorous by adopting an appropriate measure-theoretic formulation with a continuum of
consumers. Again, we have found this to considerably complicate our paper, without adding anything to
either the conclusions or the literature on the measure-theoretic approach to economics.
6between private consumption and giving to charity, the consumer takes as given m,s ,t ,
G and maximizes ui given in (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.3). Since ui
1 > 0,
the budget constraint (2.3) holds with equality. Hence, we can use it to eliminate ci from














Notice that for notational convenience we have suppressed reference to m because







Following Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), gi,Gare strategic complements
(strategic substitutes), if and only if
∂2Ui
∂gi∂G
≥ 0( ≤ 0) (2.6)




23 − (1 − s)u
i
13 ≥ 0( ≤ 0) (2.7)
where subscript i,j refers to the cross partial derivative between the ith and jth arguments.
2.3. Government
We shall assume that the proceeds of the income tax, tM, are spent towards tax relief on
donations to charity, s
Xn
i=1 gi, and on aggregate direct grants from the Government to
the charities, D ≥ 0. Therefore, the (balanced) Government budget constraint is













which we assume to be a strictly increasing function of the individual utility functions,
u1,u 2,...,u n, of the consumers13.
13Note that the resulting social optimum is constrained by the available set of instruments {s,t,D}.




varied across individuals. We assume that this is either not desirable or not possible (although it is
straightforward to extend our analysis to cope with the more general case).
72.4. Charities
In order to focus on the simultaneous determinants of private giving and the inﬂuence of
public policy, we assume that charities are passive players in the game14.T h e y m e r e l y
collect all donations from private consumers,
Xn
i=1 gi, and from the government, D.T h e
production function for charities is a simple linear function that converts the sum of all
giving
Xn
i=1 gi + D to some aggregate output G ≥ 0,s o




3. Equilibrium Giving and Public Policy
Consider a consumer who enjoys warm glow, i.e., ui
2 is not identically zero, and has strictly
positive income, mi > 0. We assume that, for such a consumer, the problem in (2.5) has













2 , i =1 ,2,...,n (3.2)
where subscript j denotes partial derivative with respect to the jth argument. We








22 < 0 (3.3)
If a consumer does not enjoy any warm glow from giving, i.e., ui
2 ≡ 0, then,
g
i ≡ 0 (3.4)
In Example 1 of Section 6.1 we consider the possibility that some, but not all, consumers
enjoy warm glow from giving. Hence, for the former set of consumers who enjoy warm
glow, the equilibrium (strictly positive) level of private giving is the solution to (3.2). For
the latter set of consumers gi ≡ 0.
Since ui is C2, it follows that gi is C1.D i ﬀerentiating (3.2) implicitly w.r.t. G we get













14Hence, while we feel that in actual practice charities could be strategic players, using means such as
bundling, marketing etc. to attract additional donations, we abstract here from these issues.




From (2.7), (3.3), (3.5), (3.6) it follows that gi,Gare strategic complements (strategic
substitutes), if and only if
∂gi
∂G
≥ 0( ≤ 0) (3.7)
Example 1 in Section 6.1, below, considers an economy in which public policy and
private charitable giving redistribute income towards the poor. The strategic comple-
mentarity between gi,Garises because the warm glow that a consumer receives from an
extra unit of giving is larger if the charity is larger (and so perhaps the charity is more
prominent).
Example 2 in Section 6.2, below, considers an economy in which voluntary giving
ﬁnances a public infrastructure good that is essential to enjoy private consumption. The
strategic complementarity between gi,Garises because a higher G results in a higher utility
from a given level of consumption expenditure but a reduced marginal utility of private
consumption. In response to an increase in G, a utility maximizing consumer will then
spend less on consumption and give more to charity, thus,
∂gi
∂G ≥ 0.
3.1. The Aggregate Desire to Give to Charity
Given actual aggregate donation to charity, G, the aggregate of all desired donations,
D+
Xn
i=1 gi,m a yb ed i ﬀerent. Therefore, we introduce a new function, F, which represents
the aggregate of all desires to give to charity




We substitute from (2.8) into (3.8) to get




From (3.1), (3.9) it follows that
0 <F(s,t,G) <M (3.10)
Hence, w.l.g., we may view F (s,t,.) as a mapping from [0,M] to [0,M]:










9From (3.7), (3.12) it follows that if gi,G are strategic complements (strategic substi-
tutes), then
FG ≥ 0( ≤ 0) (3.13)
We summarize the results on strategic complements (substitutes) in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1 : (a) The following are equivalent.
(i) gi,Gare strategic complements (strategic substitutes).
(ii) ui
23 − (1 − s)ui
13 ≥ 0( ≤ 0).
(iii)
∂gi
∂G ≥ 0( ≤ 0).
(b) If gi,Gare strategic complements (strategic substitutes), then FG ≥ 0( ≤ 0).
3.2. Equilibria
The economy is in equilibrium if, and only if, the aggregate of all desires to donate to
charity, F, equals the aggregate of all donations, G, i.e.
G(s,t)=F (s,t,G(s,t)) (3.14)
Proposition 1 : An equilibrium exists. At equilibrium, 0 <G (s,t) <M .If gi,G are
strategic substitutes then the equilibrium is unique.
3.3. Equilibrium Analysis
We wish to investigate how aggregate equilibrium giving to charity, G(s,t), depends on










(Ftt + FtGGt)(1− FG)+Ft (FtG + FGGGt)
(1 − FG)
2 (3.17)
Proposition 2 is obvious from (3.13), (3.15), (3.16), but we state is formally for future
reference.
Proposition 2 :L e tj = s or t.A s s u m eFj > 0.I fFG < 1, then Gj (s,t) > 0.H o w e v e r ,i f
FG > 1, then Gj (s,t) < 0. In particular, if gi,Gare strategic substitutes then Gj (s,t) > 0.
10The common sense expectation is that Gs (s,t) > 0, i.e., subsidies to private giving
induce additional private giving. However, the possibility of FG > 1 gives rise to a perverse
comparative static eﬀect, Gs (s,t) < 0, namely, that subsidies reduce private aggregate
giving. The intuition is that if FG > 1 we have an excessive desire to contribute to charity.
However, a low level is needed to dampen the excessive desire to contribute. The result
is a low level of contribution in equilibrium. The various cases arising from Proposition 2
are illustrated below.
A. Common-Sense Case: Fs > 0, FG < 1.
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Figure 3.1: The Case Fs > 0 and 0 <F G < 1,s 1 <s 2.
We illustrate the case Fs > 0 and 0 <F G < 1 in Figure 3.1. As stated in Proposition
2, it is obvious that the optimal level of aggregate giving is increasing in the subsidy
to individual giving i.e. Gs > 0. The same result also holds true when Fs > 0 and
FG ≤ 0.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i fgi,Gare strategic substitutes, and so FG ≤ 0, aggregate donations
nevertheless increase in equilibrium when the price of giving is reduced.
B. The Perverse Case: Fs > 0, FG > 1.
In Case B, illustrated in Figure 3.2, equilibrium aggregate contributions are decreasing
as the price of giving becomes more attractive (larger s). The intuition is that when
11 
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Figure 3.2: The Case Fs > 0,F G > 1,s 1 <s 2.
FG > 1 and Fs > 0, each consumer knows that a decrease in the price of giving will induce
additional private desire to give (Fs > 0). However, because FG > 1, consumers over-react
to expectations of an increase in G.T h u s ,G needs to fall in order to ensure equilibrium
in the market for charity15.
This case provides a possible explanation of the surprising eﬀects of the tax reforms
of the 1980’s on charitable giving in the US; see, for instance, Clotfelter (1990) for the
evidence. The tax reforms increased the price of giving by reducing the tax preference for
charitable donations. Contrary to the predictions of most economists, charitable contribu-
tions continued to rise in the following years. However, this empirical result is consistent
with our analysis when FG > 1. Similar observations would apply to the equilibria of
Section 4 where FG > 1.
15To aid intuition, imagine an upward sloping demand curve that cuts the supply curve from below.
Following an increase in income, we get the perverse result that price (and quantity) will fall. In demand
theory this case requires atypical assumptions such as giﬀen goods. By contrast, in the charity context
such cases arise naturally; strategic complementarity being a necessary condition.
124. Multiple Equilibria
In this section we assume that Fs > 0,s 1 <s 2,F G > 0 (i.e. gi,Gare strategic complements;
see Lemma 1)16. However, we distinguish between two main cases here, FGG < 0 and
FGG > 0.
A. Fs > 0,F G > 0,F GG < 0.
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Figure 4.1: The Case Fs > 0,F G > 0,F GG < 0,s 1 <s 2.
This case is illustrated in Figure 4.1. For each level of s, we have two equilibria, one
low (superscripted with a − sign) and the other high (superscripted with a + sign); we
have omitted the argument t for greater visual clarity. Starting at the high equilibrium,
aggregate donation to charity can be increased by increasing tax exemption for charitable
contribution, from s1 to s2. However, at the low equilibrium, increasing tax allowances
reduces aggregate donations even further.
A better policy would be a one-oﬀ lumpsum grant from the Government, D,d i r e c t l y
to the charity. We will illustrate, in Section 6, that this moves the economy permanently
16In a diﬀerent setting, in Cooper and John (1998), individual team members choose their eﬀort levels,
strategically, given the eﬀort levels of other team members. They show that, in a symmetric Nash equi-
librium, strategic complementarity in eﬀort levels among the team members is a necessary condition for
multiple equilibria.
13from the low equilibrium to the high equilibrium. Once the economy reaches the high
equilibrium, the socially optimal public policy can be implemented. For the moment, the
following heuristic explanation might suﬃce.
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Figure 4.2: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0,F G > 0,F GG < 0,t 1 <t 2.
Suppose that the situation is as depicted in Figure 4.2. We start with t = t1 and the
low equilibrium given by G−(t1). Suppose that it is desirable to move the economy to a
high equilibrium. In the absence of any direct grants from the government, it might be the
case that subsidies to private giving, ﬁnanced by taxation, are counterproductive. This
would happen, for instance, if G
−
t < 0, G−
s < 0; as is the case in Example 1 of Section 6.
It would seem, then, that no government intervention is eﬀective.
Consider, however, an alternative policy in which the Government makes a direct
grant to the charity equal to (or greater than) G−(t1), ﬁnanced by an income tax levied
at the rate t = t2 >t 1. T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h ea g g r e g a t ed e s i r et og i v et oc h a r i t yi s
D+
Xn
i=1 gi >G −(t1); recall our original assumption that gi > 0 for at least one i.H e n c e ,
the equilibrium aggregate giving, G, must be greater than G−(t1).S i n c et h ee c o n o m yi s
now on the F(s,t2,G) locus and G>G −(t1) >G −(t2) the sole candidate for equilibrium
is the high equilibrium, G+(t2) >G +(t1). Once G+ is established, each individual will
make her private giving decision conditional on G+, thereby raising her own giving to a
higher level such that equilibrium beliefs about G+ become self-fulﬁlling.
14So what should (optimal) public policy look like when the high equilibrium, G+,i s
established? It would be welfare improving if the direct public grant, D, can be withdrawn
and replaced by an equivalent contribution by the private sector. This is because an
equivalent amount contributed by the private sector is welfare improving on account of
the warm glow that individuals receive from giving. But why might public policy be able
to induce additional private giving at the new equilibrium, G+, when it could not do so at
the old equilibrium, G−? The reason is that the signs of G
+
t , G+




s . In particular, it might be the case that G
+
t > 0, G+




s < 0 ); as is the case in Example 1 in Section 6.1. In this case, the perverse eﬀects of
public policy that arise in the low equilibrium are reversed in the high equilibrium. Hence,
once the high equilibrium is established the common-sense comparative statics obtain, so
public policy can then be used to induce additional private giving that is consistent with
replacing the direct government grant completely. The latter can then be withdrawn.
Hence, temporary direct government grants can be welfare improving17.
B. Fs > 0,F G > 0,F GG > 0.
Suppose, as in Figure 4.3, that the economy is at the lowest equilibrium, G−(s1).H e r e ,
an increase in tax exemptions, from s1 to s2, would move the economy to the next, higher,
equilibrium, G−(s2); but at an increased tax rate.
A much better policy could be a grant from the government directly to the charity.
This would move the economy to the high equilibrium. The situation is depicted in Figure
4.4. The intuition is identical to the one for Case A, hence, we will only sketch the outline
of the argument.
Start with the low equilibrium, G−(t1). In this case, subsidies to private giving, ﬁnanced
by taxation, are eﬀective in raising the equilibrium from G−(t1) to G−(t2) >G −(t1) (see
Figure 4.4). However, as pointed out above, this entails a permanently higher tax rate.
Suppose now that the government gives a direct grant to charity, D, equal to at least
G−(t1),a n dﬁnances the grant by raising taxes at the rate t2 >t 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, the
aggregate desire to give to charity is D +
Xn
i=1 gi >G −(t1).B e c a u s et = t2 we are now
on the F(s,t2,G) locus, hence, the only possible candidate for equilibrium is the high
equilibrium, G+(t2). Once the high equilibrium is established then the Government can
withdraw its direct grant and reduce the tax rate to its original level.
17We do not consider direct grants by non-governmental institutions, such as the national lottery in
the UK or private charitable trusts and organizations. However, such grants can be accomodated in our
framework. These will, in principle, perform a role that is similar to direct government grants except that
non-governmental organisations cannot levy taxes.
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Figure 4.3: The Case Fs > 0,F G > 0,F GG > 0, s1 <s 2.
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Figure 4.4: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0,F G > 0,F GG > 0,t 1 <t 2.
165. Welfare Analysis











Diﬀerentiating (5.1), implicitly, using (3.4) and the ﬁrst order conditions (3.2) (or

















where Gs,G t are given by (3.15), (3.16) respectively.































Propositions 3, 4 and 5 below derive the optimal mix between private and public giving
to charity in diﬀerent cases. We shall use these propositions extensively in Section 6; in
particular, these propositions will be crucial to determine the optimal public policy at
diﬀerent equilibria.
Proposition 3 :I fGt ≤ 0 then s = t =0 . Thus, all giving to charity is private giving
and there are no direct Government grants to charity. Conversely, if at a social optimum
t>0 then Gt > 0.
Proposition 3 implies that in an optimum characterized by Gt ≤ 0, no government
intervention is needed, warm glow and/ or altruism suﬃce to maximize social welfare.
Proposition 4 : If at an optimum Gs ≥ 0 then s attains its maximum possible value and
the government makes no direct contributions to charity i.e. D =0 . Conversely, if a social
optimum involves positive government donations to charity i.e. D>0 then, necessarily,
Gs < 0.
17Proposition 4 shows that if subsidies are eﬀective then no direct government grant is
needed. This is because when private donations replace an identical amount of public
donations welfare improves on account of the warm glow received by private givers.
Proposition 5 : If at a social optimum Fs ≥ 0 and FG < 1,o ri fFs ≤ 0 and FG > 1,t h e n
all contributions to charity come from individual private donations. No direct government
grant is involved.
6. Examples
In this section we present two illustrative examples of the general theoretical model. In the
ﬁrst example, charitable contributions provide income to consumers who, otherwise, have
no income. Hence, private contributions supplement the public, redistributive, activities
of the Government. In the second example, charitable contributions ﬁnance public good
provision. Formally, because contributions to the public good are also voluntary, the basic
framework of our paper applies to the second example as well.
6.1. Example 1: Redistribution and contribution to charity
We consider an economy where some consumers have no income. Their consumption
expenditure is ﬁnanced entirely by either charitable donations made by other ‘caring’
consumers with positive income and/ or by direct grants, ﬁnanced through taxation, made
by the Government.
Let there be n consumers in total. Of these, p consumers, 0 <p<n , have positive
income (mi > 0); they are indexed by i =1 ,2,...,p. The other n − p consumers have no
income (mi =0 ); they are indexed by i = p +1 ,p+2 ,...,n. All incomes are costlessly
veriﬁable by the Government.
The aggregate of all donations to charity (private and public), G, is divided equally
among the consumers with no income; so each recipient gets G
n−p.
Of the p consumers with positive incomes, k, 0 <k≤ p, care about the plight of those














i; i =1 ,...,k (6.2)
The other p − k consumers have positive income but do not care about those with no
income. The utility function of the latter two groups of consumers (the non-caring with
positive income and those with no income) is given by
u
i =l nc
i; i = k +1 ,k+2 ,...,p,p +1 ,...,n (6.3)
18From Lemma 1, (6.1), (6.3) it follows that gi, G are strategic complements.










i = M (6.4)
and, for k = p,






ai > 0 (6.6)
Proposition 6 : The only economically interesting cases occur when
[m + t(M − m)]
2 > 4(1 − s)A










m + t(M − m) ±
q
[m + t(M − m)]
2 − 4(1 − s)A
¸
.
The resulting equilibria are as in Figure 4.2. In the ﬁgure, t1,t 2 are two feasible tax
rates such that t1 <t 2.
Suppose an economy is at the low equilibrium, G−, and also suppose that it is socially
desirable to move it to the high equilibrium, G+. How can this be done? From (10.17)
and (10.18) in the appendix: G
−
t ≤ 0. Hence, from Proposition 3, it would appear that the
best policy is no intervention i.e. s = t =0 , leaving the economy at the low equilibrium,
G−. However, an alternative policy is possible, as we shall now describe; see Figures 6.1,
6.2.
Set the tax rate t as follows.
t = G
−(0)/M (6.7)
Since G−(0) is an equilibrium, it must be aﬀordable. Hence, 0 <G −(0) <M .I t
follows that 0 <t<1 and, hence, feasible. Set
s =0 (6.8)
D = tM = G
−(0) (6.9)
Thus, the Government gives a direct grant equal to G− (0)(D>G −(0) will also work)
ﬁnanced from an income tax. Since gi > 0 for some i (i.e. i =1 ,2,...,k) it follows, from
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Figure 6.1: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0,F G > 0,F GG < 0.
(2.10), that G>D= G−(0). Hence, because we are on the F(0,t,G) locus (see Figure 6.1)




Once the economy is at the good equilibrium, G+, s,t can be adjusted to their socially
optimum values. We now address this issue.
6.1.1. Socially optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
At the low equilibrium, G−, private individuals could not be induced to make additional
contributions because of the perverse comparative static eﬀects, G−
s < 0, G
−
t < 0. These
comparative static eﬀects can be reversed at the high equilibrium. We have two cases to
consider.
1. If k<p , so that not all consumers with positive income contribute to charity, then,
from (6.4), m<M . Hence, from (10.16), (10.17) in the appendix G+
s > 0, G
+
t > 0
i.e. the comparative static eﬀects are reversed at the high equilibrium; see Figure
6.2. Depending on parameter values, the optimal tax rate may be positive, in which
case it can be found by setting Vt =0in (5.6). From (10.8), (10.15) in the appendix
20and Proposition 5 it follows that D =0 . Thus, once the economy has moved from
G− to G+, the direct grant from the Government to charity should be phased out.
In the new, socially optimal, equilibrium all the revenue is used to subsidize private
donations to charity. The intuition is that direct Government grants do not generate
warm glow, which private giving does. Hence, if the direct grant could be withdrawn
but private individuals induced to contribute an equivalent amount (and so derive
warm glow) then society’s welfare is increased.
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Figure 6.2: The response of equilibrium G to the tax rate.
2. If k = p (so that all consumers with positive income contribute to charity) then,
from (6.5), m = M. Hence, from (10.18), G
+
t =0 . It follows, from Proposition 3,
that s = t =0 . Thus, once the (one-oﬀ)g r a n tt oc h a r i t y( ﬁnanced by an income
tax) has shifted the economy from the bad equilibrium, G−, to the good equilibrium,
G+, no further government intervention is needed.
6.1.2. A numerical illustration
Consider an economy with n = 1900 consumers. Of these, 1000 do not have an income
of their own. They are supported by charity. The other p = 900 consumers each has a
positive income mi =1 ;i =1 ,2,,...,900.O ft h e s ek =4 5 0get a warm glow from giving
to charity. Speciﬁcally, ai =0 .01 for i =1 ,2,,...,450. The others do not derive warm glow




















Initially, assume s = t =0 .T h e n G− =1 5 0 , G+ = 300. Suppose the locus passing
through G− is socially inferior to that passing through G+. How can government policy




t < 0, the best policy would appear to be no intervention: s = t =0 .
However, there is an alternative. The government sets s =0 ,t=1 /6.T h i sr a i s e sat o t a l
tax revenue equal to tM =9 0 0 /6 = 150. Since G
−
t < 0,i tf o l l o w st h a tG− < 150 at
t =1 /6. The government makes a direct grant D = 150 to the charity. Since gi > 0,
i =1 ,2,,...,450,w em u s th a v eG = D +
X450
i=1 gi >D=1 5 0>G −. Hence, G = G+.
Once the economy is on the G+ locus, s,t can be given their optimal values.
6.2. Example 2: Voluntary contributions to a public good
Individuals often voluntarily contribute to, and directly use, several kinds of public goods
such as health services and education18. Suppose that the utility function of consumer i,
























i < 1; b
i > 0 (6.12)
bi
G
< (1 − t)m
i (6.13)
Condition (6.13) guarantees that consumer i has enough disposable income, (1−t)mi,
to sustain a level of private consumption expenditure, ci,g r e a t e rt h a nbi
G and also a positive
level of donation to charity, gi. It is straightforward to check that ui
1 > 0,u i
2 > 0,u i
3 > 0.
This example can be given the following interpretation. Private (voluntary) contri-
butions to public goods,
Xn
i=1 gi, plus public contribution, D, ﬁnanced from taxation,
provide the necessary infrastructure for private consumption. Higher utility is derived,
from a given level of private consumption expenditure, ci, the higher is aggregate expen-
diture on infrastructure, G = D +
Xn
i=1 gi.
18For the US, education, health and human services account for the greatest proportion of private giving
after religion; see Table 3 in Andreoni (2004).


















Proposition 7 : The only economically interesting cases occur when
B
2 > 4C















Hence, the economy has two equilibria. One characterized by low voluntary contribu-
tions to the public good causing low aggregate spending on the public good infrastructure,
G−. From (6.11), we see that, to achieve any speciﬁc utility level, high private consump-
tion expenditure is needed. From the budget constraint, (2.3), we see that less income can
be contributed to the public good, perpetuating the low expenditure on infrastructure.
The other equilibrium is characterized by high contributions to the public good, causing
high aggregate expenditure on infrastructure, G+. In turn, this implies that relatively
less private consumption expenditure is needed to reach any speciﬁc utility level. Hence,
relatively more income is left over to donate to charity, perpetuating high expenditure on
infrastructure.
The resulting equilibrium is as in Figure 4.2. In the ﬁgure, t1,t 2 are two feasible tax
rates such that t1 <t 2.
Suppose an economy is at the low contribution to the public good/ poor infrastructure
equilibrium G−; and suppose it is socially desirable to move the economy to the high
contribution/ good infrastructure equilibrium G+. How can this transition be achieved?
By (10.28), Gs =0so subsidies are ineﬀective.
From (10.35) G
−
t < 0, so, from Proposition 3, it would appear that, at the low equi-
librium G−, the best feasible policy is no intervention: s = t =0 , leaving the economy at
the low equilibrium G−.
However, an alternative policy is possible, as we shall now describe; see Figure 6.1, 6.2.





23Since G− (0), being an equilibrium, must be aﬀordable, i.e., 0 <G − (0) <M, it follows
that 0 <t<1 and, hence, feasible. Set
s =0 (6.17)
D = tM = G
− (0) (6.18)
i.e. the government gives a direct grant to public good provision equal, at least, to
G− (0),a n dﬁnanced from an income tax. Since gi > 0 it follows, from (2.10), that
G>D= G−(0).S i n c e w e a r e n o w o n t h e F(0,t,G) locus (see Figure 6.1) and the




Once the economy is on the high contribution/ good infrastructure equilibrium, s and t
can be adjusted to their socially optimal values. But what are the socially optimal values?
We now address this question.
6.2.1. Socially optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
In view of (10.33), (10.35) and (10.37) in the appendix, the graphs of G± are as in Figure
6.2. Once the economy has moved to the new equilibrium, G+, the direct grant from the
government to the public good can be phased out. The reason is that since Government
grants and individual giving are imperfect substitutes, hence, a drawback of grants is that
warm glow does not accrue to individuals. Thus, welfare can be improved by withdrawing
the grant and getting individuals to contribute instead.
In the low equilibrium, G−, we have seen above that the optimal policy solution is
s = t =0 . However, at the high equilibrium, G
+
t > 0 ( s e e( 1 0 . 3 5 )o rF i g u r e6 . 2 )a n d
so the comparative static results are reversed. The optimal tax rate, which can be found
from (5.6), balances the loss in private consumption against the gain arising from the
additional amount of the public good. Also, from (5.5), Vs > 0,h e n c e ,i ti sw e l f a r e
improving to provide additional subsidies. Thus, all tax revenues are used to ﬁnance
subsidies on charitable donations. In the socially optimal solution at the high equilibrium,
G+, therefore, s>0,t>0 while D =0(see Proposition 4).
6.2.2. Numerical Illustration
As a numerical illustration, consider an economy of n =5 0identical consumers each with
income mi =1 .C h o o s e ai =0 .1 and bi =0 .8. Suppose that initially, s = t =0 .T h e n





and the feasibility condition (6.13) is satisﬁed.
Suppose that the economy is, initially, at the low equilibrium G− =1 .I ft h em o v et o









and the feasibility condition (6.13) still holds at this tax rate. The government uses its
entire tax revenue tM =1=G− to make a contribution D = G− =1to the public good.
Since gi > 0,G= D +
Xn
i=1 gi > 1=G−. Hence, the only candidate for equilibrium is
G = G+. Once the economy is on the high locus G+, the policy parameters s,t can be
adjusted to their socially optimal values. This will involve the phasing out of the direct
grant. Once the ﬁnal position of the, new, socially optimal, equilibrium is established, the
government uses all tax revenues to subsidize voluntary contributions to the public good.
The direct grant, here, is only a temporary measure to shift the economy from the low,
G−, locus to the high, G+,l o c u s .
7. Dynamics
In this paper we have concentrated exclusively on equilibrium analysis. For certain pur-
poses, a rigorous analysis of the time path of adjustment may be required. This, however,
will involve specifying a precise list of the information sets of each of the players, the up-
dating rules, and a learning process19. This, however, lies beyond the scope of the current
paper.
The reader of this paper might have wondered about the stability properties of the
equilibria. To study the stability of equilibria, an adjustment process needs to be speciﬁed.
A popular class of adjustment processes in economics is given by the following partial
adjustment scheme.L e t G∗ be an equilibrium, G(k) the value of G in period k and λ a
constant that satisﬁes 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then the adjustment process is given by
G(k +1 )=( 1− λ)G
∗ + λF (s,t,G(k)) (7.1)
Stability of G∗ is guaranteed if |λFG(s,t,G∗)| ≤ β<1, which is ensured by choosing
as u ﬃciently small λ. I ne x a m p l e s1a n d2i nS e c t i o n6 ,a n di nt h es p e c i a lc a s eo f
(7.1) with λ =1 , G− is unstable while G+ is stable. In general, however, and without
19At the moment there is a lack of consenus in the profession about the appropriate model of learn-
ing and there is ‘too large’ a variety of models to choose from. These include reinforcement learning,
learning through ﬁctitious play, learning direction theory, Bayesian learning, imitation learning, experi-
ence weighted attraction learning, etc. For a survey of the experimental evidence on these theories, see
Camerer (2003)
25precise speciﬁcation, there is no presumption of stability/ instability associated with these
equilibria.
8. Strategic Giving
W eh a v ea s s u m e di nt h i sp a p e rt h a tw h e na n yi n d i v i d u a li makes her decision to give to
charity, gi, she takes as given aggregate contributions, G. Our view is that, typically, the
contribution of each individual is negligible relative to the total budget of the charity. In
making their decisions individuals do not imagine that their gifts will make an appreciable
diﬀerence to the charity’s total budget. This, however, is in contrast to the standard liter-
ature which makes the converse assumption i.e. in making her decision, gi, the individual
t a k e sa sg i v e nG−i = G−gi, the contributions of all others, and behaves strategically with
respect to all others.
One would expect that, as the number of individuals increases, the results of the two
approaches should converge. Here, we show this to be the case for our two examples in
Section 620.
8.1. Nash Equilibria for Example 1
We ﬁrst derive the symmetric Nash equilibria (SNE) for Example 1 in Section 6. Suppose
that all caring individuals with positive income are identical. Using the same parameter
values as in the numerical example in subsection 6.1.2 we have ai = a =0 .01, mi = m =1 ,
i =1 ,2,...,450. For simplicity, we report the case s = t = D =0 . Other cases are similar.











subject to the individual budget constraint (2.3). We have replaced total aggregate
giving, G,b ygi + G−i. In making her decision, the consumer now takes as given the
contribution of all others, G−i.T h eﬁrst order condition to the maximization problem in
(8.1) is
1
1 − gi =0 .01(G + g
i) (8.2)
In a SNE, gi = kG where k =4 5 0 . Substituting gi =4 5 0 G in (8.2) we get the following
quadratic equation in G
4.51G
2 − 2029.5G + 202500 = 0 (8.3)
Solving for the two Nash equilibria GN−, GN+ we get
G
N− =1 4 9 .33 (8.4)
20For a more rigourous treatment of the more general case, see al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2005).
26G
N+ =3 0 0 .66 (8.5)
For non-strategic giving, the two equilibria, given in subsection 6.1.2, were G− =1 5 0 ,
G+ = 300. Comparing to (8.4), (8.5) we ﬁnd that the equilibria are virtually identical, as
claimed earlier, although the number of givers, 450, is relatively small.
8.2. Nash Equilibria for Example 2
We show here, analytically, the eﬀect on the equilibrium magnitudes as n →∞as well as
















































































Under non-strategic giving, each consumer chooses her contribution, given the per capita
aggregate contribution, G/n. Therefore, the problem of the ith consumer is to maximize






Under strategic giving, on the other hand, each consumer chooses her contribution, given
the contribution of all others, G−i. Therefore, the problem of the consumer is to maximize











21Note that di is now a parameter of the model. This reformulation is necessary because as n increases,
G increases and so eﬀectively the parameter bi in the original formulation falls relative to G.I n o t h e r
words, such a replication of the economy alters the underlying model, which is not admissible. The
reformulation in terms of the parameter di, however, is not subject to this problem.
27Comparing (8.9), (8.10) we see that, because wi
3 is bounded, as n →∞ ,t h eﬁrst order
conditions for strategic and non-strategic giving coincide. Note that this result does not
depend on any particular function form, hence, it is completely general.
It remains to show, as we did in subsection 8.1, that even for smaller n, the equilibria of
the two models are reasonably close. To keep the exposition simple we focus on symmetric
equilibria below. Set di = d, ai = a and mi = m for all i. Furthermore, to simplify the
exposition we report the case s = t = D =0 .
8.2.2. Symmetric Nash Equilibria
Using (8.10), the ﬁrst order condition in the case of a SNE is
1 − a










In a SNE, g = G
n. Substituting G = ng in (8.11) we get the following quadratic equation
for individual donation, g
g






















where superscript ‘N’ denotes the Nash outcome
8.2.3. Symmetric Non-Strategic Equilibria
In this case the consumer takes as given aggregate giving. Using (8.9), the ﬁrst order
condition is
(1 − a)






In a symmetric equilibrium g = G/n. Substituting G = ng in (8.14) we get a quadratic
equation in g
g
2 − amg + ad =0 (8.15)











Clearly, from (8.13), (8.16), gN+ → g+ and gN− → g−, as n →∞ .
288.2.4. Simulations
In this subsection we address, numerically, the question of whether the results under
strategic and non-strategic giving converge as the number of givers increases? From (8.16),
the equilibrium level of individual giving in the non-strategic equilibrium is independent
of the number of givers, n. Substituting m =1 ,a=0 .1, b =0 .8, d = b
50 =0 .016 in (8.16),
it can be checked that for any n
g
− =0 .2 (8.17)
g
+ =0 .8 (8.18)
Below, we report the simulation results for the optimal individual giving in the strategic
case, gN±,a sn increases, using m =1 ,a=0 .1, d =0 .016.
TABLE-I : Multiple Nash Equilibria as the Number of Givers Varies
n 100 500 1000 10,000
gN− 0.0177 0.0195 0.0198 0.02
gN+ 0.0823 0.0805 0.0802 0.08
It is evident that even for relatively small values of n, gN− and gN+ converge rapidly
to g− and g+. This seems to accord with the actual size of a typical individual donation
relative to the budget of a charity. Furthermore, it allows one to conduct comparative
static results that would be diﬃcult in the case of strategic giving, even if restricted to the
case of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
9. Conclusions
Uncoordinated individual giving leads to the possibility that there could be multiple equi-
libria in private giving. Furthermore, these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. An interesting
question then is the following. Given that a society is stuck at a low equilibrium, can policy
help it to attain a high equilibrium?
Coordination problems and the resulting multiple equilibria are endemic in economics,
however, we typically lack a means and/ or a method of choosing among the possible
equilibria. In the context of private philanthropic activity, we show that direct grants to
charities, made by the government, can enable an economy to achieve a high equilibrium.
We also examine the optimality of alternative mix of private and public contributions
to charity. We show, for some parameter values, that additional incentives to giving,
such as those arising from the tax deductibility of private contributions, can actually
worsen matters by reducing the aggregate of private contributions in equilibrium22.F o r
22S e eF i g u r e3 . 2 ,G− in Figure 4.1 and G+ in Figure 4.3.
29other parameter values, however, and we provide suﬃcient conditions23,g i v i n gt oc h a r i t y
should be entirely funded by private individual contributions, possibly subsidized through
taxation.
Throughout we focus on equilibrium analysis. The issues involved with the dynamics
of time paths involve fundamental questions about the precise learning mechanisms to be
used. Although progress on learning mechanisms is being made and in due course such
mechanisms may enrich our model, currently such issues lie beyond the scope of this paper.
While we view the principal contribution of this paper as providing new insights into
the literature on the economics of philanthropy it also enriches our understanding of mul-
tiple equilibria in general. In particular, the role of public policy in “multiple equilibria
engineering”, namely, policy induced jumps from a bad to a good equilibria, is not very well
understood. We show precisely how, in the context of voluntary giving and an equilibrium
analysis, such engineering might take place.
10. Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Let
H (s,t,G)=G − F (s,t,G) (10.1)
We know from (3.10) that 0 <F(s,t,G) <M,h e n c e ,
H (s,t,0) = −F (s,t,0) < 0
H (s,t,M)=M − F (s,t,M) > 0.
Since H (s,t,G) is continuous, it follows that H (s,t,G)=0for some G∗ ∈ (0,M) i.e.
G









From Lemma 1, when gi,G are strategic substitutes, ∂F
∂G ≤ 0,h e n c e ,∂H
∂G > 0 for all
possible values of G. Thus, there is a unique equilibrium value of G. On the other hand,
from Lemma 1, strategic complementarities ensure that ∂F
∂G ≥ 0 (but not ∂F
∂G > 1), hence,
H(.) is not monotonic in G so a unique equilibrium is not guaranteed.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :L e t(s,t) maximize social welfare (5.4). We have assumed that
mi ≥ 0, with some mi > 0,u i
1 > 0,u i
3 ≥ 0 and Ui > 0.I fGt ≤ 0 then, from (5.6), Vt < 0
23See Proposition 5.
30and it follows that necessarily, s = t =0 . The last statement in the proposition is simply
the contrapositive of the ﬁrst.¥
Proof of Proposition 4:L e t(s,t) maximize social welfare (5.4). We have assumed
that gi ≥ 0, with some gi > 0, ui
1 > 0,u i
3 ≥ 0 and Ui > 0.I f Gs ≥ 0 then the ﬁrst
order condition (5.5) implies that Vs > 0 and so s attains its maximum possible value.
Recall from subsection 2.1 that the maximum value of s is bounded away from unity. The
consequence of s =1is that, from (2.3), the price of giving is zero and so any individual
with ui
2 > 0 would like to give an inﬁnite amount to charity. Since individual private
giving can be increased substantially by decreasing its price, it is best to channel all giving
privately because of the additional beneﬁt arising to each individual from warm glow and,
therefore, D =0 . The last statement in the proposition is simply the contrapositive of the
ﬁrst.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : Proposition 5 is an immediate consequence of (3.15) and Propo-
sition 4. ¥















; i =1 ,...,k (10.4)
From (6.2) and (10.3) we see that gi(s,t,G) > 0 and from (10.4) ci (s,t,G) > 0.O n
the other hand, from (6.3) we get that
g
i ≡ 0; i = k +1 ,k+2 ,...,n (10.5)
From (3.9), (6.4) - (6.6), (10.3), the aggregate desire to give to charity is





Ft = M − m ≥ 0.( 1 0 . 7 )





FG =( 1− s)
A
G2 > 0 (10.9)
FGG = −2(1− s)
A
G3 < 0 (10.10)
31From (3.14) and (10.6), an equilibrium G, must satisfy the quadratic equation
G
2 − [m + t(M − m)]G +( 1− s)A =0 (10.11)






m + t(M − m) ±
q
[m + t(M − m)]
2 − 4(1 − s)A
¸
(10.12)
For real roots we need [m + t(M − m)]
2 ≥ 4(1−s)A.I f[m + t(M − m)]
2 =4 ( 1−s)A
then, from (10.9), FG =1 . From (3.15), (3.16) it would follow that Gs,G t are undeﬁned.
Hence, the only economically interesting cases occur when,
[m + t(M − m)]
2 > 4(1 − s)A (10.13)










b,a sw e l la s( 1 0 . 9 )
and (10.12) - (10.14), we get
G = G
+ ⇒ FG < 1; G = G
− ⇒ FG > 1 (10.15)










t < 0 (for m<M,i . e . ,k<p ) (10.17)
G
±






Since FGG < 0, Ft > 0, (1 − FG)
2 > 0, we get that the sign of Gtt is the reverse of that
of Gt. From (10.17), (10.18) we then get
G
+
tt < 0 and G
−
tt > 0( m<M , i.e., k<p ) (10.19)
G
+
tt =0 ( m = M, i.e., k = p) (10.20)
This completes the proof.¥
32P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :Applying the ﬁrst order condition (3.2) to the utility function


























From (6.12), (6.13) and (10.21), (10.22), we see that gi(s,t,G) > 0 and ci(s,t,G) > bi
G.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that the second order conditions also hold.
Hence, given s,t,G; gi(s,t,G),c i(s,t,G) maximize utility (6.11) subject to the budget
constraint (2.3), and are unique.











































i < 0 (10.27)





From (10.24) and Proposition 5, it follows that, at a social optimum, D =0 , i.e. no
direct grant from the government to the charity is involved. Giving to charity is entirely
funded by private donations, which are subsidized from taxation if s>0, t>0.
To make further progress, we need to determine the equilibrium values of G.F r o m



















Substituting (6.14), (6.15) in (10.29) we get
G












If B2 < 4C, then no equilibrium exists. If B2 =4 C then a unique equilibrium exists,
and is G = B
2 =
√
C. But then, from (10.26), (6.15), FG =1 . In this case, neither Gs nor
Gt are deﬁned, see (3.15), (3.16). Hence, the only interesting case is when
B
2 > 4C (10.32)










b, as well as (10.26),
(6.15) and (10.31) - (10.33), we get
G = G
+ ⇒ FG < 1; G = G
− ⇒ FG > 1 (10.34)





t < 0 (10.35)





Since FGG < 0, Ft > 0, (1 − FG)
2 > 0, we get that the sign of Gtt is the reverse of that





tt > 0 (10.37)
This completes the proof.¥
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